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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 08/07/2011

Accident number: 719

Accident time: 09:30

Accident Date: 22/12/2010

Where it occurred: AF/0112/00169,
MF355, Shpoli Baba
Village, Sorubi District,
Kabul Province
Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Country: Afghanistan

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Other

Date of main report: Not recorded

ID original source: None

Name of source: UNMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: PMN AP blast

Ground condition: hard
rocks/stones
steep slope
Date last modified: 08/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate area marking (?)

Accident report
A Board of Inquiry report and a Lessons Learned document have been made available. Their
conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost. Text in
square brackets [ ] is editorial.
The documents are reproduced below, edited for anonymity.
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BOARD OF INQUIRY ABOUT FATAL DEMINING ACCIDENT of [the Victim] deminer of
[Demining group] DT-13
INTRODUCTION
Dr [Name removed], Programme Director for the Mine Action Coordination Centre of
Afghanistan (MACCA) convened a Board of Inquiry (BOI) team to investigate the
circumstances involved in the demining accident causing fatal injuries to [the Victim] the
deminer of [Demining group] DT-13.
The BOI comprised the following personnel:
Dr. [Name removed] Chief of QM MACCA: Chairman
[Name removed]: Member
[Name removed]: Member
[Name removed] from [Demining group] Observer
A copy of the appointment of personnel to carry out the formal investigation including the BOI
Terms of Reference is at Annex A to this report.
GEOGRAPHY AND WEATHER
The accident occurred on 22 Dec 2010 in MF # AF/0112/00169/MF 355 located in Shpoli
Baba village, Sorubi district of Kabul province to the east side of Kabul city at the begging of
Mahipar Pass closed to Mahipar Power plant. This is a rocky area, hillside with a steep
sloping terrain. It is cold in winter season, but due to lack of snowfall this year, the weather is
suitable for demining operations. The ground is medium in terms of hardness and dry. The
area is lightly bushy. Accident happened in a clear and calm weather.
Priority of Task
Although 8 accidents happened there on local people and on their animals since 1980, and
the clearance of the area is requested by Government and is covered in [Demining group]
plan, but the priority of the task is identified as low.
SITE LAYOUT AND MARKING
The site marking was visible, the admin area was well arranged and visible, but the access
lanes were not well prepared and marked. This point was not raised during the internal and
external QA visits.
MANAGEMENT, SUPERVISION AND DISCIPLINE ON SITE
Although the site layout, deployment of deminers, safety distance, medic post, admin area,
control point and vehicle parking area were well managed. But as the area was steep sloping
and extra safety and precautionary measures in terms of preparing steps for deminers’
stabilization and using ropes/sticks to tie deminers during the operations were not considered.
These precautionary measures were discussed by operations assistant, but the team
command group refused and said that the nature of is loose and sticks will not be driven to
the ground to tie the rope with.
QUALITY ASSURANCE AND QUALITY CONTROL
Internal QA was conducted on 20/12/2010 and external site visit was conducted by AMAC
relevant Operations Assistant on 29/11/2010 which was the second day of the team
deployment in this task. The result of this visit was CR.
COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTING
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The communication between team, sub-office and organization HQ was maintained very well.
MEDICAL REPORTS
The medical report of ICRC hospital Pakistan/Peshawar is available. [Not made available.]
The report states that the victim deminer died due to head trauma and internal chest injuries
which caused broncho-pneumonia and septicemia leading to cardio-respiratory failure.
WITNESS INTERVIEWS AND STATEMENTS
The team leader, assistant team leader, the team medic and nearest deminer to the accident
point were interviewed by external investigation team and statements are attached as Annex
E. [Not made available.]
DETAILS OF THE MINE/ERW INVOLVED
It was a Russian made anti-personnel PMN mine.
EVIDENCE OF RE-MINING
No evidence of re-mining.
EVIDENCE OF SITE INTERFERENCE OR TAMPERING AFTER THE ACCIDENT
The accident site was not tempered.
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
The deminer was dressed with PPE and visor. He got fatal injuries due to falling around 200
meters down in a rocky area.
USE OF MINE DETECTION DOGS (MDD)
Not suitable.
USE OF Mechanical MACHINES (MDU)
Not suitable.
DATE OF LAST REVISION COURSE FOR TEAM INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT
At the beginning of each mission [Demining group] teams are subject to one day refresher
course and the last course was held on 27 Nov 2010 in Sorubi base camp, but [Demining
group] representative was not able to provide documentary evidence to confirm [the Victim]’s
presence in mentioned refresher course. The BOI team received a record of weekly technical
review which is being conducted by team command group in the base camp on Fridays, [the
Victim] was present in that course.
DETAILS OF MEDICAL EVACUATION AND TREATMENT
After the accident happened, on 09:30 and the deminer fall down from accident point to the
bottom of cliff, the first aids started by paramedic at 9:35 am and as the road leading to Kabul
city was blocked by heavy traffic, so the team decided to evacuate the victim to Jalalabad. By
9:55 am the victim was ready to be shifted to Sorubi district Hospital and then Jalalabad
Public Health Hospital. He was admitted at district hospital at 10:30 am. After some
stabilization and control of bleeding, at 12:00 the victim transferred to Jalalabad public health
hospital. On 13:00 he was admitted there, after the operations completed on his injuries and
further stabilization, the [Demining group] was advised by doctors to transfer the injured
deminer to Pakistan. He was transferred from Jalalabad hospital to Peshawar (Pakistan) on
the next day 23/12/2010 at 7:00am. He passed away in ICRC hospital on 31/12/2010 at 1:00
pm.
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PARTICULARS OF DEMINERS INSURANCE
The [Demining group] staff including deminers are insured with State life insurance company
of Pakistan.
DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE ACTIVITIES ON THE DAY OF THE ACCIDENT
On 22 December 2010 team arrived to the area on 06:30 and started operation on 07:00
working for 45 minutes and then 15 minutes break, the second round started on 08:00 for the
same working and breaking period. The third round started on 09:00, [the Victim] worked in
his clearance lane using metal detector and then stopped on 09:25 wanted to mark his
clearance lane. He picked up marking material/equipment attempted to mark his clearance
lane. On the way back he slipped out from his cleared lane to un-clear area, his right foot
came on a mine and the accident happened.
TECHNICAL POINTS CONTRIBUTED TO ACCIDENTS
The deminer slipped to un-clear area while attempting to mark his cleared lane, his foot came
on a mine and the accident occurred. But the causes of his death seem to be fatal injuries
sustained when he had fallen to the bottom of cliff from the accident point around 100 meters
down. Operations assistant from AMAC central discussed risk preventive measures with
[Demining group] after the accident happened and recommended that the ropes should be
used to tie in deminers during the operation in order to stop them falling in the event of
accident or slip. But due to loose nature of the ground in some parts of the minefield this was
not applicable. AMAC conducted QA visit at the beginning of the task, he discussed the risk
mitigation measures in such a way to reduce the target from 500 sqm area to 250 sqm per
day and conduct full excavation and create staircases to stable the deminers during the
operations in such a steep sloping area.
[Demining group] developed SOP for working on steep sloping areas, but the risk reduction
and or safety precaution in such a way to use ropes which has been practicing by other
organizations is not covered there. This was not applicable at the beginning of the task due to
ground conditions.
The team practiced CASEVAC 2 times before accident happened, but the detail of evacuation
planned, accident point and communication is not clear. It is not clear whether the rehearsal
conducted only from the foot of the cliff to the hospital or from the upper part where the
deminers are busy. The alternative evacuation root is also not mentioned.
Although it was planned by [Demining group] to evacuate the victim to Kabul city which was
close to the working site, but due to traffic jam in Mahipar pass, [Demining group] decided to
evacuate the victim to Jalalabad. So the evacuation took almost 3 hours to Jalalabad and
next day the deminer was evacuated to Pakistan for specialised treatment, therefore, the
delay in evacuation of victim may also had contributed to the severity of his injuries and so led
to his death.
SUMMARY
The accident happened while the de miner was attempting to mark his cleared lane. He
slipped to un-clear area and his foot came on PMN mine and caused the accident. This
explosion also caused the victim to fall down about 100 meters to the bottom of cliff from the
accident point and get more crush injuries which seem to be the causes of death.
CONCLUSION
Carelessness of deminer and lack of comprehensive risk assessment in difficult worksite
conditions resulted in accident and subsequent death of deminer.
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RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT REOCCURRENCE
•

[Demining group] operations department is recommended to include the use of rope
and sticks and creating staircases in their related SOPs and make sure its
implementation where applicable in such steep sloping areas.
• Internal QA cell of [Demining group] is recommended to improve the QA visits in
order to catch such critical issues and make sure that a comprehensive risk
assessment is done and risk mitigation measures are considered by the team.
• The CASEVAC rehearsals should be conducted more objectively and include all
possible scenarios as per all possible risks and worksite conditions. The alternative
plans for evacuation should also be included.
• The command group is recommended to implement a strict control on deminers at all
times during the operations especially in such complicated areas.
• The deminers should take extra care during the operations and do not ignore
standard operating procedures and risk mitigation measures.
Dr. [Name removed], BOI Chairman
ANNEXES: [Not made available]
Annex A: BOI - Terms of Reference
Annex B: Site operations plan
Annex D: Internal investigation report
Annex E: Statements and Witness reports

LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] FATAL DEMINING ACCIDENT
INTRODUCTION:
A Board of Inquiry (BOI) was convened by MACCA Programme Director to investigate the
circumstances involved in the demining accident causing fatal injuries to [the Victim] the
deminer of [Demining group] DT-13. The accident occurred at 09:30 on 22 Dec 2010 in MF #
AF/0112/00169/MF 355 located in Shpoli Baba village, Sorubi district of Kabul province.
SUMMARY:
The accident occurred in task number 355 in a rocky area which is a hillside with a steep
sloping terrain. The deminer was busy in marking of his cleared lane, slipped to un-cleared
area, his right foot came on PMN mine and the accident happened. The deminer [the Victim]
closed his cleared lane 09:25 and wanted to mark it, he came down to his starting lane, took
the marking materials and went back to start marking. On 09:30 when he was busy in marking
the stones on the edge of his clearance lane, due to loose nature of the ground and slope
there, he slipped to un-cleared area where his right foot came on a PMN mine and caused the
mine to go off and the accident happened. At the result of explosion he lost his right foot from
below knee and fell down to the bottom of cliff and sustained more injuries including head
trauma and other internal injuries during this falling down event.
Finally the deminer died in hospital on 31 Dec 2010, the causes of his death seem to be the
complications of severe injuries sustained when he had fallen down to the bottom of cliff from
the accident point.
CONCLUSIONS:
Carelessness of deminer and lack of comprehensive risk assessment and difficulties in
worksite conditions resulted in accident and subsequent death of deminer.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
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The following points are to be considered:
•

[Demining group] operations department is recommended to include the use of rope
and sticks and creating staircases in their related SOPs and make sure its
implementation where applicable in such steep sloping areas.
• Internal QA cell of [Demining group] is recommended to improve the QA visits in
order to catch such critical issues and make sure that a comprehensive risk
assessment is done for each worksite and risk mitigation measures are considered by
the team.
• The CASEVAC rehearsals should be conducted more objectively and include all
possible scenarios as per all possible risks and worksite conditions. The alternative
plans for evacuation should also be included.
• The command group is recommended to implement a strict control on deminers at all
times during the operations especially in such complicated areas.
• The deminers should take extra care during the operations and do not ignore
standard operating procedures and risk mitigation measures.
Feedback on any preventive and corrective actions taken by [Demining group] is required to
be submitted to the MACCA office by no later than 7 days, effective to the issue date of this
letter.

Victim Report
Victim number: 911

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: DECEASED

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: 210 minutes

Protection issued: Frontal apron; Long
visor

Protection used: Frontal apron; Long
visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: severe Chest; severe Head
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Leg Below knee
FATAL
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "victim deminer died due to head trauma
and internal chest injuries which caused broncho-pneumonia and septicemia leading to
cardio-respiratory failure" nine days later.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the
investigators found that the site layout, lane marking and clearance plan were unsatisfactory.
The Victim may have stepped outside the cleared area without knowing he was doing so. The
secondary cause is listed as a Management Control Inadequacy because the procedures in
use were inappropriate for the terrain and the group’s management should have ensured that
this was not the case.
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The delayed CASEVAC was unfortunate and may have contributed to the Victim’s demise. If
the demining group had not conducted an appropriate CASEVAC exercise, that should have
been corrected.
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